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with  Multinational Corporations 
Elhanan  Helpman 
Tel-Aviv University  and Massachsetts Institute of Tlechniology 
Using  the  idea  that  firm-specific  assets  associated  with  marketing, 
management,  and  product-specific  R & D  can  be  used  to  service 
production  plants in countries  other than the country in which these 
inputs are employed,  I develop  a simple  general  equilibrium  model 
of  international  trade  in  which  the  location  of  plants  in  a differ- 
entiated  product  industry  is a decision  variable. The  model  is then 
used  to derive  predictions  of  trade  patterns,  volumes  of  trade,  the 
share  of  intra-industry  trade,  and  the  share  of  intrafirm  trade  as 
functions  of  relative  country  size and  differences  in relative  factor 
endowments. 
I.  Introduction 
The  role  of  multinational  corporations  in  the  conduct  of  foreign 
trade  has  grown  over  time  and  has  reached  very  large  proportions.  In 
the  United  States,  for  example,  at the  all-manufacturing  level,  multi- 
national  corporations  accounted  in  1970  for  62  percent  of  its exports 
($22  billion  out  of  $35  billion)  and  34  percent  of  its  imports  ($10.5 
billion  out  of  $31  billion)  (see  U.S.  Tariff  Commission  1973,  p.  322). 
It is therefore  not  surprising  that  the  ramifications  of  their  existence 
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are  of' major  concern  to  international  trade  experts.  Nevertheless, 
there exists no well-articulated  theory that explains  the conditions  for 
their  emergence  or  predicts  under  these  conditions  a  structure  of' 
trade that comes  close  to observed  trade  patterns. 
Existing  general  equilibrium  theories  of  international  trade  have 
been developed  without explicit treatment  of the multinational  corpo- 
ration.  The  discussion  of' direct  foreign  investment  in  Caves  (1971) 
(and the work that followed  from it) is an exception.  There  are many 
treatments  of' the  multinational  corporation  in a partial equilibrium 
framework  (see Caves  1982, chap. 2), but they shed only limited light 
on  a  central  problem  of  trade  theory,  namely,  the  explanation  of' 
trade  patterns.  We are in need  of  a theory  that describes  conditions 
under  which  firms find  it desirable  to shift  activities to foreign  loca- 
tions  and  that  is  able  to  predict  the  pattern  of  trade  that  emerges 
under these conditions.  Foundations  of such a theory are proposed  in 
this paper, with the following  important features:  (a) there are differ- 
entiated  products,  economies  of' scale, and monopolistic  competition; 
and (b) there  exist inputs  (e.g.,  management,  marketing,  and  R & D) 
that can serve  product  lines without  being  located  in their  plants. 
In this paper the theory deals with single product firms. I deal with 
horizontal  and  vertical  integration  in  Helpman  (1983b).  Firms max- 
imize profits and make, therefore,  cost-minimizing  location choices of 
product  lines.  This  feature  brings  about  the  emergence  of  multina- 
tional  corporations  as a result  of  the  tendency  of' factor  rewards  to 
differ  across countries.  Here  the  emphasis  is on one  source  of  pres- 
sure on relative factor rewards-differences  in relative factor endow- 
ments. Transport  costs and tariffs are assumed  away, so that produc- 
tion facilities are not established  in order to save transport costs or in 
order to produce  behind  tariff walls. Other reasons for multinational- 
ity, such as tax advantages  of various forms,  are also not considered. 
Apart  from  describing  in a general  equilibrium  system conditions 
under  which  firms choose  to become  multinational,  the  theory  pro- 
vides  an  explanation  of  trade  patterns  in  which  the  multinational 
corporations  play a central role. There  is intersectoral,  intra-industry, 
and intrafirm trade.  The  last trade component  has become  of' major 
importance  in recent  years (see  U.S.  Tariff  Commission  1973, chap. 
3; Buckley and  Pearce  1979). 
In order  to bring  out  as clearly as possible  the  value added  of' the 
theory,  simplifying  assumptions  are used  throughout.  The  next  sec- 
tion  provides  a description  of' the  basic model.  The  structure  of' an 
equilibrium  in an integrated  world  economy  is described  in Section 
III. Then,  in Section  IV, the features  of' the integrated  world equilib- 
rium  are  used  in  order  to  describe  the  relationship  between  factor 
endowments  and trade patterns. The  behavior of the volume  of trade MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS  453 
is  analyzed  in  Section  V  and  the  behavior  of' the  shares  of  intra- 
industry  and  intrafirm  trade  is analyzed  in Section  VI.  The  last sec- 
tion is devoted  to concluding  remarks. 
II.  The  Basic  Model 
For the purpose  of' the current  study  I employ  a two-sector  modified 
version  of' the  now  standard  model  of  international  trade  in differ- 
entiated  products.  Preferences  are  assumed  to  be  identical  every- 
where  and  representable  by a homothetic  utility  function  u(Y, Ut), 
where  Y is the  consumption  level  of  a  homogeneous  product  and 
U=  u,(*) is the subutility level attained in the consumption  of differ- 
entiated  products.  The  function  u,( ) depends  on the specification  of 
preferences  for a differentiated  product; they can be, for example,  of 
the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)  type or of the Lancaster (1979)  type (see 
Helpman  [1983a,  sec.  8] for a description).  In both cases a demand 
function  facing  a producer  of  a single  variety can be derived;  in the 
Dixit-Stiglitz  case  this  demand  function  is of  the  constant  elasticity 
type (assumed  to be larger  than one),  while  in the  Lancaster case its 
elasticity depends  on  commodity  prices and  the  number  of  varieties 
available to consumers  (and this elasticity is always larger than one). 
It is assumed  that there are two factors of production:  labor, L, and 
a general  purpose  input,  H,  whose  special  role in the  production  of 
differentiated  products  will be  explained  below.  The  homogeneous 
product  is  produced  by  means  of  a  standard  linear  homogeneous 
production  function  with the associated  unit cost function  C(  WL, wII), 
where  wi is the  reward  to factor  i. A producer  of  the  homogeneous 
product has to employ  all inputs in the same location. In a competitive 
equilibrium  the  price  of' the  homogeneous  product,  taken  to be the 
numeraire,  equals  unit costs: 
1  =  cy.(w1, w1i).  (1) 
The  structure  of' production  of' differentiated  products  is  more 
complicated.  A firm that wants to produce  a given variety has to hire 
the general  purpose  input H and adapt it at a cost in order to make it 
suitable  for  the  production  of  this variety.  Once  adapted,  the  input 
becomes  a firm-specific  asset in the sense  used by Williamson (1981), 
and it is tied to the  entrepreneurial  unit.  However,  this firm-specific 
input can serve many plants and it need  not be located within a plant 
in order to serve its product  line. In particular, it can serve plants that 
are  located  in  different  countries  (see  Hirsch  [1976]  for  a  similar 
assumption).  Inputs  that fit this description  are management,  distri- 
bution,  and  product-specific  R & D. The  importance  of' this type of' 
asset in  the  operation  of' multinational  corporations  is described  in 454  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Caves (1982,  chap.  1). Clearly, in practice, combinations  of inputs are 
required in order to generate  such assets; here this aspect is simplified 
by assuming  that only H can serve  this purpose. 
Let l(x, hx) be the quantity of labor required  to produce  x units of a 
variety of the differentiated  product  in a single plant when hx units of 
H  have been  adapted  for  its particular  use.  A possible  form  for  this 
function  is I = fp +  gl(x, hx), wherefp  >  0 and g&() is positively linear 
homogeneous.  Here fl  generates  a plant-specific  fixed  cost  and  the 
variable cost component  exhibits  constant  returns to scale. More gen- 
erally, I assume that 1( ) is the inverse of an increasing-returns-to-scale 
production  function  in which hx is essential  for  production.  Let also 
g(w1., w11,  hx) be the  minimum  costs required  in order  to adapt hx to 
the  desired  variety,  where  g(-)  is  associated  with  a  nondecreasing- 
returns-to-scale  production  function.  Then  the firm's single plant cost 
function  is 
Cx(w1, w11,  x)  =  min  [w1l1(x,  hx)  +  g(WL,  wIs hx)  +  wHhx]. 
h~x 
This  function  obviously  has the standard  properties  of cost functions 
associated with increasing-returns-to-scale  production  functions.  One 
can also define  cost functions  for larger numbers  of plants. The  point 
worth noting,  however,  is that the firm or corporation  has fixed costs 
that  are  corporation  specific  but  not  plant  specific  (they  consist  of 
hiring  hx and adapting  it), it has plant-specific  fixed  costs, and it has 
plant-specific  variable costs. The  assumption  that 1( ) is the inverse of 
an increasing-returns-to-scale  production  function  implies that it pays 
to concentrate  production  in a single  plant unless there are transpor- 
tation  costs  or  differences  across  location  in  product  prices.  Since 
impediments  to  trade  are  not  considered  in  this  paper,  the  single 
plant cost function  described  above  is relevant  for  what follows.  All 
varieties have the  same cost structure. 
It is assumed  that there is Chamberlinian-type  monopolistic  compe- 
tition in the differentiated  product  sector. Hence,  as is well known, in 
this case  firms equate  marginal  revenue  to  marginal  costs  and  free 
entry brings about zero profits in every firm. In a symmetrical equilib- 
rium these  two conditions  can be written  as: 
px  =  Cx(wI,  WH, x)  (2) 
and 
R(p, n)  =  0(WL,  w11, x),  (3) 
where p is the price of every variety of the differentiated  product; R(-) 
is average  revenue  divided  by marginal  revenue,  and it measures  the 
degree  of  monopoly  power  (it is a constant  under  the  Dixit-Stiglitz MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS  455 
specification  of preferences);  n is the number  of varieties available to 
consumers;  and  0( ) is average  costs divided  by marginal costs, using 
Cx(-), and it measures  the degree  of returns to scale in the production 
of differentiated  products  (see Helpman  1981). 
The  formal  conditions  of  industry  equilibrium  (1)-(3)  that  were 
described above are identical to the conditions  used in existing models 
of trade in differentiated  products  (see Helpman  1983a). The  impor- 
tant difference  lies in the interpretation  of the technology  available to 
corporations  in the differentiated  product  industry.  As in most trade 
theory  I will assume  that factors  of  production  do  not  move  across 
national borders.  However,  because of the technology  available in the 
differentiated  product  industry,  the  firm-specific  asset hx can  serve 
product  lines  in  plants  that  are located  in  countries  other  than  the 
country  in which  hx is located,  and  the  specificity  of  hx implies  that 
arm's-length  trade in its services is an inferior  organizational  form to 
an integrated  firm (see  Klein,  Crawford,  and  Alchian  1978).  This  is 
precisely  the  feature  that  brings  about  the  emergence  of  multina- 
tional  corporations.  We  will  call  the  country  in  which  hx and  the 
entrepreneurial  center are located the parent country of the corpora- 
tion  and  the  country  in  which  the  subsidiary  is  located  the  host 
country. 
III.  Equilibrium  in an Integrated  World  Economy 
As a first step toward the study of international  trade between  econo- 
mies of  the type described  in the previous  sections,  I describe  in this 
section the symmetrical equilibrium  of an integrated  world economy. 
The  features  of  the  integrated  world  economy  will then  be  used  to 
identify  patterns of cross-country  distributions  of the world's endow- 
ment of labor and the H factor, which generate  certain trade patterns 
and volumes  of trade. This particular link provides valuable informa- 
tion because differences  in factor endowments  can be associated with 
differences  in relative  country  size and  differences  in relative  factor 
endowments,  two variables that play a major role in empirical studies. 
We  will study  trade  patterns  and  volumes  of  trade  for  a fixed-size 
world economy. 
In a symmetrical  equilibrium  of an integrated  world economy  fac- 
tor  prices  are  the  same  everywhere,  and  all  the  corporations  that 
operate  in  the  sector  that  produces  differentiated  products  have  a 
similar structure; every corporation  produces  one variety, but there is 
no overlap  in varieties  produced  by two different  corporations:  they 
employ  the  same  quantity  of  the H  factor  and  the  same quantity  of 
labor; they charge  the same  price  for every variety and  produce  the 
same quantity of each one of them. Free entry into the industry brings 456  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
profits  down  to  zero.  The  number  of  corporations  n is treated  as a 
continuous  variable. This  is a reasonable  approximation  when  n is a 
large number. 
Apart  from  (1)-(3)  the  equilibrium  conditions  consist  of  equilib- 
rium  conditions  in  factor  markets  and  in commodity  markets.  The 
equilibrium  conditions  in commodity  markets depend  on  the  speci- 
fication of preferences,  and we will not present them because no use is 
made of them in what follows  (for an example  see Helpman  1981). It 
is only  important  to  remember  that  the  upper  tier  utility  function 
u(Y, U,) is homothetic.  The  equilibrium  conditions  in factor markets 
are: 
a1,Y(wL,  wII)y  +  AIX(WL,  w11,  x)n  L,  (4) 
al1y(wj, w11)y  +  Alix(wi,, w1s,  x)n  =  H,  (5) 
where aiy(w1,  w1e)  acy(w1,  w1)/aw,-, i  =  L, H. is the cost-minimizing 
input of factor i per unit output  of the homogeneous  product; Aix(wi., 
Wjj, X) =  aCx(w1,  w11,  x)lAw1,  i  L, H, is the cost-minimizing  input  of 
factor i in a representative  corporation  in the differentiated  product 
industry,  and  L and  H  are  the  total  quantities  of  labor  and  the  H 
factor  available.  The  quantity  A11x(  )  consists  of  hx plus  any  other 
quantity of H that might  be required  as an input  in the process  that 
converts  hx into  a firm-specific  asset.  Condition  (4)  assures  equilib- 
rium in the labor market, and (5) assures equilibrium in the H market. 
Conditions  (1)-(5)  plus an equilibrium  condition  in commodity  mar- 
kets  (e.g.,  that  the  demand  for  Y equal  its  supply)  determine  the 
equilibrium  values of factor rewards (we and was),  the price of differ- 
entiated  products  (p), the output  level of a single variety of the differ- 
entiated  product  (x), the  output  level  of  the  homogeneous  good  (y), 
and the number  of corporations  in the differentiated  product  indus- 
try (n), which equals the  number  of varieties available to consumers. 
For what follows I make the natural assumption  that in this equilib- 
rium the  homogeneous  product  is labor intensive  relative to the dif- 
ferentiated  product;  that is, 
any  >_ALX 
ally  Al1x 
Under  this  assumption  the  equilibrium  distribution  of  employment 
across sectors can be described  by means of  figure  1. The  vector OE 
represents  the  endowment  of' factors  of  production,  the  vector  OQ 
represents  employment  in the differentiated  product  industry,  while 
OQ' represents  employment  in the homogeneous  good  industry. The 
line BB'  represents  an equal  factor cost line;  its slope  equals relative 
factor rewards. It is tangent  to an isoquant of the homogeneous  good MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS  457 
11  factor 
H 
B 
n  1 
E 
y=y 
0  labor 
0  B'  L 
FIG.  1 
at its intersection  point  with OQ'. At the intersection  of BB' with OQ 
the equal  factor cost line  is also tangent  to an isoquant,  but one  of  a 
different  nature.  This  isoquant  can be recovered  from  the cost func- 
tion by means of the set {(Lx, Hx)  I 3(wL,  wI)  >  0 such that (LX,  HX) = 
[ALX(W1, we/, x), A11x(w1, was,  x)]}. This  is the collection  of  inputs  that 
makes possible the production  level of a single corporation,  and it can 
be represented  by a regularly shaped  isoquant, labeled n  =  1 in figure 
1. Now  draw an entire  family of isoquants  by a radial expansion  and 
contraction  of this single corporation  isoquant.  Every isoquant in this 
family represents  a different  number  of corporations,  equally sloped 
on  a ray from  the  origin.  Thus,  at the  intersection  of BB'  with OQ 
there  is an isoquant  belonging  to this family  that is labeled  n  =  n'. 
Because  of  its definition  this isoquant  is tangent  to BB'. 
Finally, observe  that using  the  single  corporation  isoquant  we can 
calculate the number  of corporations  that can operate  in equilibrium 
with inputs  represented  by a point on OQ by dividing  the distance of 
the point  from  the origin  by OEx. In a similar way the output  of the 
homogeneous  good  that is obtained  in equilibrium by an input combi- 
nation  represented  by a point  on  oQ'  can be calculated  by dividing 
the distance  of the  point  from  the origin  by OEy.  This completes  the 
description  of  the  integrated  world  equilibrium  that is necessary  for 
what follows. 458  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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B 
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IV.  The  Pattern  of  Trade 
In the  standard  Heckscher-Ohlin  two-country,  two-good,  two-factor 
model  in which there are no factor intensity reversals and preferences 
are homothetic  and identical  across countries,  the set of endowment 
allocations  can  be  divided  into  two  subsets.  In  the  interior  of  one 
subset there  is factor  price equalization  and  no specialization  in pro- 
duction,  and every country exports  the good whose production  makes 
relatively  intensive  use  of  the  factor  with which  the  country  is rela- 
tively well endowed.  In the interior of the other  subset every country 
pays a lower  reward to the factor of production  with which it is rela- 
tively well endowed  and  a higher  reward to the other  factor of  pro- 
duction,  at least one country specializes in the production  of the good 
which  is a relatively  heavy  user  of  its cheaper  factor of  production, 
and the pattern of trade is the same as in the former subset. If figure 2 
(which  is a box-diagram  reproduction  of  fig.  1 with  0j  representing 
the  origin  for  country  j) were  to describe  feasible  allocations  across 
countries  for a standard  Heckscher-Ohlin  type economy,  then the set 
with factor price equalization  would  be represented  by O1QO2Q'  and 
the other  set by its complement.' 
' See Dixit and  Norman  (1980,  chap.  4), who  also deal with a case in which  there  is 
factor intensity  reversal. MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS  459 
The  pattern  of' trade  that emerges  in the  present  model  is much 
richer than described  above.  It is useful  to describe it by starting with 
intercountry  factor allocations in the set  OlQO2Q'  of' figure 2. Because 
of  the  symmetry  in  structure  it is sufficient  to  analyze  endowment 
points above the diagonal  0102;  this way country  1 is the H-f'actor-rich 
country  while  country  2 is the  labor-rich country.  Allocations  in this 
set were analyzed  in Helpman  (1981). 
Take,  for example,  the factor endowment  point E in figure 2. This 
point  describes  an  allocation  (L',  H')  of  labor  and  the  H  factor  to 
country  1 and  an  allocation  (L2, H2)  of  labor  and  the  H  factor  to 
country  2.  It is straightforward  to see  that with this world  structure 
there  is an  equilibrium  with  factor  price  equalization  whose  cross- 
country  aggregation  looks  the  same  as the  integrated  world  equilib- 
rium described  in the  previous  section.  In this equilibrium  corpora- 
tions based  in one  country  have no incentive  to open  subsidiaries  in 
the  other  country  in  order  to locate  product  lines  there.  Assuming 
that  under  these  circumstances  all operations  of  a corporation  are 
concentrated  in the parent  country,  the output  level of the homoge- 
neous  product  in  country j and  the  number  of  corporations  in  the 
differentiated  product  industry  in  that country  can  be  solved  from 
the following  factor  market equilibrium  conditions: 
ajyyI  +  A,-xn-I  =  LI,  (6) 
a,,yyd +  A,,xnl  =  HI  (7) 
Here  the input-output  coefficients  in the homogeneous  product  sec- 
tor and labor and H-factor  use per corporation  in the differentiated 
product  industry  are  taken  from  the  equilibrium  of' the  integrated 
world economy,  because factor prices, product prices, and output  per 
variety are the same in both cases. This is indeed  an equilibrium  if the 
solution of (y', nW)  from (6)-(7)  is nonnegative  forj  =  1, 2. But this is, 
of course, the case for every point in 0 lQ02, as is demonstrated  by the 
broken-line  parallelogram  drawn  from  the  particular E in figure  2. 
Now  observe  that because  profits  are zero  all income  is factor in- 
come.  Hence,  by drawing  through  E a line BB' whose slope  is w11w11, 
we show the cross-country  income  distribution.  Relative incomes  can 
be read off as follows: Let C be the intersection  point of BB' with the 
diagonal  1?2.  Then  the relative income  of country  1 is OIC divided 
by CO2.  In fact, by a proper choice of units, 0 IC represents  the income 
level of country  1 and CO2 represents  the income  level of country  2. 
Since both countries  have the same spending  pattern, country  1 con- 
sumes a proportion  s1 of  the world's output y, where s1 is its share in 
world income.  Hence  with a line  through  C parallel to O?Q its com- 
sumption  of the homogeneous  product  can be represented  by OCy, 460  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
where Cy is the intersection  point of this line with O Q'. Since produc- 
tion y'  is represented  by O1Py, country  1 imports  the  homogeneous 
product.  Finally, since trade is balanced,  this means that country  1 is a 
net exporter  of  differentiated  products. 
I have shown that in the set of factor allocations 0o  Q02,  the intersec- 
toral pattern  of  trade  is the  same  as in the  Heckscher-Ohlin  model. 
Here,  however,  there  is  also  intra-industry  trade  in  differentiated 
products.  Country j produces  n1 varieties of the differentiated  prod- 
uct and it exports  them  to its trading  partner.  Hence,  the pattern of' 
trade  that  emerges  is the  same  as in the  models  of  trade  in differ- 
entiated  products that were developed  in recent years. To summarize, 
for factor endowments  in the set 0  Q02  free trade generates  no incen- 
tive for the formation  of multinational  corporations.  The  structure of' 
trade is the same as in recent  models  of trade in differentiated  prod- 
ucts;  the  intersectoral  trade  pattern  is  explained  by differences  in 
relative factor endowments  while intra-industry  trade is explained  by 
monopolistic  competition  in differentiated  products. 
The  theory  proposed  in this paper  takes on interest because  it can 
identify and analyze the implications of circumstances in which corpo- 
rations find it profitable  to establish  subsidiaries abroad. This  theory 
associates  multinational  corporations  with  the  ability of  firms to ex- 
ploit cross-country  differences  in factor prices by shifting  activities to 
the cheapest  locations.  Generally speaking,  this theory can be applied 
to differences  in factor prices that result from many different  sources. 
However,  in what follows  it is applied  to potential  differences  in faic- 
tor rewards that arise from differences  in relative factor endowments. 
It is clear from  conventional  theory  and from  the previous  discus- 
sion that factor endowment  points  above O0Qo) lead to unequal  fac- 
tor prices if firrns have to employ  all factor inputs in the same country. 
Suppose  that  under  these  circumstances  the If  factor  is cheaper  in 
country  1 and  labor  is  cheaper  in  country  2.  Now  consider  what 
happens  when  a corporation  need  not  employ  all labor and  II  at a 
single  location;  for simplicity also assume  that no labor is used  in the 
process that adapts hAx  to the particular variety produced  by the corpo- 
ration.  Clearly,  under  these  circumstances  corporations  wish  to 
choose  country  1 as their  parent  country  and they wish to open  sub- 
sidiaries in country  2. These  desires  reduce  the demand  for labor in 
country  1 and increase  it in country  2, and they increase the demand 
for the  [I  factor in country  1 and  reduce  it in country  2. An equilib- 
rium is attained  when  either  factor prices are equalized  or country  I 
becomes  the  parent  country  of  all corporations  (with unequal  factor 
prices all H  producing  differentiated  products  are located  in the II- 
cheap  country).  When  factor  price  equalization  obtains,  there  are 
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volvement  of the corporations  in the differentiated  product  industry, 
just as there  are many configurations  in the factor price equalization 
set  0IQ02.  In  the  latter  case,  factor  price  equalization  is  achieved 
without  invoking  the  possibility  that  corporations  can  decentralize 
their activities geographically.  In the case under  current examination 
factor  price  equalization  can  be achieved  because  companies  can  de- 
centralize  their  activities  geographically.  There  are  many  ways  in 
which the  decentralization  can be made  consistent  with equilibrium. 
The  rule  to  be  adopted  below  is  to  consider  equilibria  in  which 
foreign  labor employment  is as small as possible,  which  amounts  to 
considering  equilibria with the smallest number  of multinational  cor- 
porations. 
Start by considering  factor  allocations  that are in the set O1DQ of' 
figure  2.  I argue  that endowment  points  in this set lead to equilibria 
with  factor  price  equalization  and  the  emergence  of  multinational 
corporations  (I maintain in the figure the assumption  that labor is not 
used in the adaptation  process). Clearly, for endowment  points in this 
set there  are no  equilibria  in which  factor  prices  are equalized,  and 
every  firm  employs  its  factors  of  production  in  a  single  location. 
Hence,  multinational  corporations  have to emerge.  The only question 
that remains,  therefore,  is whether  their emergence  brings about fac- 
tor price equalization.  Take,  for example,  the endowment  point E' in 
figure 2. If all the resources of' country  1 are employed  in the produc- 
tion  of' differentiated  products  and  its corporations  employ  in  the 
foreign  country  the amount  of labor E'E ,,  where E'r, is the intersec- 
tion  point  with OIQ of  a horizontal  line drawn  through  E',  then  the 
aggregate  world  equilibrium  corresponds  to  the  equilibrium  of  the 
integrated  world  economy.  In  this  discussion  E'  is the  endowment 
point and E'  is the employment  point. The  existence  of international 
corporations  enables the employment  point to differ  from the endow- 
ment  point.  The  distance  O1EUT  represents  the  number  of  corpora- 
tions that are based in country  1 (n1) and the distance E,  Q represents 
the number  of corporations  that are based in country  2 (n2) (the total 
number  is the  same  as in  the  integrated  world  equilibrium).  More 
precisely, since y'  -  0 and y2 =  y, the number of corporations  that are 
based in country j, n1, and  the employment  of  labor in country  2 by 
subsidiaries of country  1-based  multinationals,  Lt, are obtained  from 
the following  factor  market clearing  conditions: 
AIxn'  =  L'  +  Lt,  antsy +  AIxnr  2  L2 -L1,  (8) 
Asian'  =  H',  a11yy +  A11xn2  =  H2.  (9) 
2 This  choice  can  be  justified  as a long-rUn  equilibrium  of  a dynamic  adjustment 
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However,  the  number  of  varieties  produced  in  country j  does  not 
equal  n';  the  number  of  varieties  produced  in  country  1 is smaller 
than n1 and  the number  of  varieties  produced  in country  2 is larger 
than n2. The  precise difference  depends  on the size of the labor force 
Lt employed  by subsidiaries.  In fact the number  of varieties produced 
in country,  MlJ  1, 2, is 
Ml  =  n1  _L  M2  =  n2  + 
ALx  ALX' 
To  summarize,  we  have  seen  that  endowment  points  in  the  set 
O1DQ  lead  to  an equilibrium  with  factor  price  equalization  and  the 
emergence  of'  multinational  corporations.  Under  my  assumption 
about  locational  tendencies  of  corporations,  in  this  set  country  1 
specializes  in the  production  of differentiated  products  and it serves 
as a base  for  the  multinational  corporations.  Country  1 imports  the 
homogeneous  product,  and  there  is  intra-industry  trade  in  differ- 
entiated  products.  Part of  the  intra-industry  trade  is carried  out  by 
multinationals.  It is also easy to see that the set O1DQ can be divided 
into  two subsets  such  that in one  subset country  1 is a net exporter of 
differentiated  products  and  in  the  other  subset  country  1 is  a  net 
importer  of  differentiated  products.  Finally,  there  exists  intrafirm 
trade whose  nature  is discussed  below. 
The  existence  of  intrafirm  trade is, of course,  well documented  in 
the empirical  literature (see, e.g.,  U.S. Tariff  Commission  1973, chap. 
2; Buckley  and  Pearce  1979).  This  takes the  form  of  imports  of  the 
parent firm from  its subsidiaries  as well as exports  of the parent firm 
to its subsidiaries.  Much of  this trade stems  from  vertical integration 
with which one  cannot  deal satisfactorily by means of the framework 
employed  in this study, but which can be dealt with in a proper exten- 
sion (see Helpman  1983b). However,  there is one genuine  component 
of intrafirm trade that is well represented  by this model,  namely,  the 
invisible exports  of  the  parent  to its subsidiaries  of  services of  the H 
input. Observe that because of the zero-profit condition  (2) labor costs 
are lower than the revenue  obtained  from  sales. This  means that the 
multinational  corporation  is  making  "profits" in  its  subsidiary,  be- 
cause the subsidiary hires labor only in the host country.  This  means 
that the profits of the subsidiary are just sufficient  to cover the costs of 
the  H  input,  which  is hired  in  the  parent  country.  The  difference 
between  revenue  and  labor  costs  of  all subsidiaries  is  pupx -  WLJL, 
where  u =  L'/ALX  is the number  of  multinational  corporations.  This 
can be considered  to be either  profits repatriated  by the parent firms 
or payments  by the  subsidiaries  for  services  rendered  by the  parent 
firms.  From  an economic  point  of  view the  second  interpretation  is 
the appropriate  one.  Hence,  [px  -  WLLJ  represents  intrafirm trade. 
In  order  to  proceed  with  the  analysis  of  trade  patterns  figure  3 MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS  463 
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reproduces  the basic features  of figure  2 and contains a further  divi- 
sion of  the set above 0  Q02.  Now consider  endowment  points  in the 
parallelogram  O2QDF. Following  the discussion  of endowment  points 
in the  set O1DQ it is clear that endowment  points  in O2QDF lead  to 
equilibria  with  factor  price  equalization  and  multinational  corpora- 
tions that are homomorphic  to the integrated  world economy  equilib- 
rium. Thus,  if E is the endowment  point, then E0, is a feasible employ- 
ment  point  when  the  techniques  of  production  of  the  integrated 
world equilibrium  are used, and EE,, represents  labor employment  of' 
country  1-based  multinationals  in  country  2.  It  is also  clear  from 
figure 3 that endowment  points  in the set DIF  can have no equilibria 
with factor price equalization,  for in order to use the integrated  world 
equilibrium  production  techniques  country  1 has to employ  in coun- 
try 2 a quantity of labor larger than total employment  required  in the 
differentiated  product  industry. This  cannot take place, because only 
in  this  sector  can  corporations  shift  activities  to  other  countries. 
Hence,  for  endowment  points  in  the  set DIF,  all corporations  that 
produce  differentiated  products  are based in country  1 and all prod- 
uct lines are located in country  2.3 Country  1 exports  services of the H 
input  and imports  all the differentiated  products  from  country  2. It 
may import  or export  the  homogeneous  product. 
3 This  is  necessarily  so  when  production  is  homothetic.  It  seems  that  the  reverse 
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Returning  to  endowment  points  in  the  set  02QDF,  observe  that 
there are two possible  patterns of trade depending  on the location of 
the endowment  point.  For the  endowment  point E and  the  employ- 
ment point E7,, country  1 imports the homogeneous  product as well as 
varieties of  the  differentiated  product  that are produced  by its sub- 
sidiaries, and it exports  the other varieties as well as services of the H 
input. The  only part of this assertion  that requires elaboration  is that 
country  1 imports  the  homogeneous  product.  This  can  be  seen  as 
follows. Let BB' be the equal cost line that passes through E. Then  its 
intersection  point  with the diagonal  0102,  that is, point C, represents 
each  country's  income  level.  Draw through  C a line  parallel  to OiQ 
and let Cy be its intersection  point with O2Q. Then  02Cy represents  the 
consumption  level  of  the  homogeneous  product  in country  2 while 
02Em represents  the  output  level  of  the  homogeneous  product  in 
country  2.  Hence,  country  2 exports  the  homogeneous  product  and 
country  1 imports  it. It is clear from figure 3 that the same pattern of 
trade emerges  for all endowment  points on BB' that belong to O2QDF. 
Now consider  endowment  points in O2QDF  that lie on B0B5. For the 
distribution  of  income  represented  by this  line  the  consumption  of 
the homogeneous  product  is represented  by 02C?  (constructed  in the 
same  way  as  above).  It  is  clear,  however,  that  only  at  endowment 
points  below  G(  does  country  2  export  the  homogeneous  product, 
while at endowment  points  above G( country  1 exports  the homoge- 
neous  product.  At point G( (as well as at point G) there  is no trade in 
the  homogeneous  product.  Generally,  at endowment  points  that are 
in O2QDF but below GO2, the pattern of trade is as the one  described 
for point E. On the other  hand,  at endowment  points  that belong  to 
O2QDF  but are above GO2, country  1 exports  the homogeneous  prod- 
uct as well as services of the H input and some varieties, while country 
2 exports  only  varieties  that are produced  by subsidiaries of country 
1-based  multinationals.  A  further  division  into  subsets  in  which 
country  1 is a net exporter  or a net importer  of differentiated  prod- 
ucts is also possible. 
We have identified  five sets of endowment  distributions relevant for 
the study of trade patterns (O0  Q02,  O1DQ, 02QDG, 02GF, and DIF). In 
four  of  them  the equilibrium  requires  the existence  of  multinational 
corporations.  Overall,  they  represent  a rich collection  of  trade  pat- 
terns with features  that seem  to fit reality better than those  provided 
by existing  trade theories. 
V.  The  Volume  of Trade 
I have described  in the  previous  section  possible  trade  patterns  and 
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factors  of  production.  As  is clear  from  the  partition  of  the  endow- 
ment set into subsets in which certain patterns of trade obtain (see fig. 
3), the  pattern  of  trade depends  on  two factors:  (a) relative  country 
size in terms of  GNP and  (b) the difference  in relative factor endow- 
ments. For example,  if country  1 is relatively small and has a relatively 
high  endowment  of  the  H  factor,  then  the  endowment  point  is in 
O1DQ,  there exist multinational  corporations  that are based in country 
1, country  1 exports  differentiated  products  and invisible H1  services 
to its subsidiaries,  and it imports  differentiated  products  and the ho- 
mogeneous  good.  Differences  in relative factor endowments  and the 
relative  sizes  of  the  countries  are  observable  economic  variables  of 
major interest.  I provide,  therefore,  in this section a description  of the 
effects  that these  two variables have  on  the  volume  of  trade.  These 
findings  are  summarized  by  figure  4  in  which  the  arrows  indicate 
directions  in which  the  volume  of  trade increases. 
Start by considering  endowment  points  in  the  set  01Q02.  In  this 
region  there are no multinational  corporations.  The  volume  of trade 
is defined  in the usual way as the sum of exports,  where  the summa- 
tion  is over  countries  and  sectors.  Because  of  balanced  trade,  this is 
equal in a two-country  world to twice the exports  of one of the coun- 
tries.  In  this  set  country  1 exports  only  differentiated  products,  so 
that the volume  of trade  is: 
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where M'  is the number  of varieties  produced  in country  1 and s2 is 
the  share  of  country  2  in  world  income.  Hence,  for  fixed  relative 
country  size the volume  of  trade increases  with the number  of varie- 
ties produced  in the H-factor-rich  country,  and for a fixed number  of 
varieties produced  in country  1 the volume  of trade increases with the 
relative size of country 2. Since Ml is fixed on lines parallel to 02Q,  the 
arrows inside the set0  ?1Q02  and on 02Q in figure 4 describe directions 
in which the volume  of  trade  increases. 
On  the  diagonal  0102  we  have  Ml  =  s'M,  where  M  =  n  is the 
number  of varieties  produced  in the world economy.  Upon  substitu- 
tion into  (10a) this yields: 
V =  2pxMs s2  for E  0  102,  (l Ob) 
implying  that the volume  of trade is largest when the countries  are of 
equal size and is smaller the more  unequal  the size of countries.  This 
is also described  by the  arrows in figure  4. 
On the line OIQ we have pxM'  =  s'Z, where Z is world income  and 
spending  and Ml  =  n1. Hence,  upon  substitution  into (lOa): 
V =  2Zs's2  for E  E  0IQ  (lOc) 
and the volume  of trade rises the more equitable is the world's distri- 
bution of income.  In figure 4 country  1 is of smaller size than country 
2 at endowment  points  on  OiQ  (which  is, of  course,  not  always the 
case);  therefore  the  volume  of  trade  increases  in  the  northeastern 
direction  as indicated  by the  arrow.  The  behavior  of  the  volume  of 
trade in the set 0  Q02  described  above is a generalization  of proposi- 
tions  5 and  6 in Helpman  (1981). 
For  endowment  points  in  O1DQ country  2  exports  the  homoge- 
neous  good  and M2  varieties  of  the differentiated  product.  Some  of 
the varieties it exports  are produced  by country 2-based  firms while [t 
of  them  are  produced  by subsidiaries  of  country  1-based  multina- 
tional corporations.  The  same  trade  pattern  exists in 02QDG, except 
that in this set all the varieties exported  by country 2 are produced  by 
country  1-based  multinationals  (i.e., M2  =  [L). This  means  that the 
volume  of  trade can be represented  as follows: 
V =  2(y2  -  y2  +  pxs'M2)  forE  E  (O1DQ) U  (O2QDG).  (11) 
For  endowment  points  in  O1DQ the  homogeneous  product  is pro- 
duced  only  in country  2, so that y2  =  y. Also,  since  y2  =  S2y  =  (1 
s)y,  upon  substitution  into  (11) we obtain: 
V =  2s'(y  +  pxM2)  for E  E  O1DQ.  (12) 
This  means that when  the relative country  size is given the volume  of 
trade increases  with the  number  of  varieties  produced  in country  2, MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS  467 
whereas when the number  of' varieties produced  in country 2 is given, 
the  volume  of' trade  increases  with  the  relative  size of  country  1, as 
shown  in figure  4. 
At endowment  points in the set O2QDG  all the varieties exported  by 
country  2 are produced  by subsidiaries  of  country  1-based  multina- 
tionals; that is, MS =,.  Also Ye =  s2y  and s2Z = y  +  wj.pLAIx,  where Z 
-  pxn  +  y. Combining  these  with (11), we obtain: 
V =  2[(1 -  sl)pxn  +  px[L(sl  -  Oj~x)]  for EE  O2QD(;,  (13a) 
where  0jx  is  the  share  of  labor  costs  in  the  production  of' differ- 
entiated  products.  Hence,  when  the relative country  size is given  the 
volume  of  trade  increases  with  the  widening  of  the  difference  in 
relative factor endowments  (with [l)  if and only if the share of country 
1 in  world  income  exceeds  the  share  of  labor  costs  in  the  differ- 
entiated  product  industry.  The  arrows  in  O2QDG that  indicate  the 
increase in the volume  of trade in the northwestern  direction  (see fig. 
4)  are  drawn  on  the  assumption  s1  >  Oj.x (which  always holds  for 
endowment  points close to 02).  It is also clear from (13a) that given  p1 
the  volume  of  trade  decreases  as  the  relative  size  of' country  1 in- 
creases.  However,  p. is constant  on  lines  parallel  to 02Q.  Therefore, 
the volume  of  trade  increases  in the  southwestern  direction  as indi- 
cated by the  arrows drawn  in region  O2QDG and  on DG. Finally, on 
02G  we have M2  =  pl, Y2  =  y2  =  s2y,  and s2Z  =  y2  +  wjjFA1  x,  which 
yield upon  substitution  into  (1 1): 
V  =2s'spx(Z 
-  )  forE E  02G,  (13b) 
implying  that the  volume  of  trade  declines  the  more  unequal  coun- 
tries are in relative size. This is indicated by the arrows drawn on o0j;. 
It remains to consider  endowments  in O2GF. In this region  country 
2 exports  only  differentiated  products  produced  by subsidiaries  of' 
country  1-based  multinationals,  and the volume  of trade is 
V =  2pxs'p.  for EE  O2GF,  (14) 
implying  that for  given  [L  the  volume  of' trade rises with the  relative 
size of country  1 and that for given relative country size it rises with [L. 
On  02F  p.  is  proportional  to  s2,  which  makes  the  volume  of' trade 
larger  the  closer  the  endowment  is to F  (because  on  02F,  sI >  s2). 
These  features  are also represented  by arrows in figure  4. 
In summary, figure 4 represents  a fairly detailed  description  of' the 
relationship  between  factor endowments  and the volume  of' trade.  It 
shows that in some  sense  the  larger  the  difference  in relative  factor 
endowments  the  larger  is the  volume  of  trade.  On  the  other  hand, 
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VI.  Intra-Industry  and  Intrafirm  Trade 
In  this  section  I investigate  the  dependence  of' the  shares  of' intra- 
industry  and  intrafirm  trade on  cross-country  differences  in relative 
factor endowments.  In all cases, except  for region  0  Q02,  the investi- 
gation  is restricted  to fixed  relative sizes of  the two countries. 
The  volume  of intra-industry  trade is defined  as the total volume of 
trade  minus  the  sum  over  all  sectors  of  the  absolute  value  of' the 
difference  between  imports  and  exports.  In  the  current  model  this 
reduces  to 
VI-  =  2px min  (sIM2,  s2M').  (15) 
The  definition  of the volume  of' intrafirm trade is more complicated. 
Exports  of  the  parent  firms of  services of  the H  factor are undoubt- 
edly part of' this volume  of  trade. The  problem  arises with the treat- 
ment of' the finished  differentiated  products.  If parent firms serve as 
importers  of'  the  finished  products  manufactured  by  their  sub- 
sidiaries, then this appears in the data as intrafirm trade, and similarly 
if subsidiaries serve as importers of the differentiated  products manu- 
factured by parent firms. In some cases the treatment of'these flows of 
goods  as intrafirm  trade  has  no  economic  justification  because  it is 
more the consequence  of' bookkeeping  practices than a true economic 
calculus.  In the  present  model  there  is no natural choice-much  de- 
pends  on the implicit assumptions  about the marketing  technology.  I 
choose,  therefore,  to define  intrafirm trade as trade in the services of 
the H factor.  Hence, 
VI-_ =  px[  -  wvLl =  (I[L,  (16) 
where  a  =  zl,,Allx  >  0. 
For endowment  points in 01 QO2 we have s IM2  <  s2M  ', so that using 
(lOa) and  (15) we calculate  the share of' intra-industry  trade  to be 
vSt  =  I  SW2M =  I2  f'()  r  EC  iO'Q02  (17) 
This  is shown  in  Helpman  (1981,  proposition  4)  to  be  a declining 
function  of' the difference  in relative  factor endowments.  The  share 
of' intrafirm trade is zero at endowment  points  that belong  to OQ02 
because  in this region  there  are no  multinational  corporations. 
Using  (12), we obtain: 
S-  px min (s'  2, s2m'1)  for E & O0DQ.  (18)  1-1  ~  SI'(y +  pxM/12) 
Since one can show that MuM2  >  s1/S2  on OiQ  then for a given relative 
country size the share of' intra-industry  trade rises with the difference MULTINATIONAL  CORPORATIONS  469 
in  relative  factor  endowments  as  we  start  moving  the  endowment 
allocation  along  an  equal  income  line  from  a  point  on  O1Q in  the 
northwestern  direction.  If  country  1 is small enough,  however,  this 
share  reaches  a maximum  and  declines  with further  redistributions 
that increase  the gap in relative factor endowments.  This  means  that 
with the emergence  of  multinational  corporations  the share of intra- 
industry trade may be positively or negatively  related to differences  in 
relative factor endowments.  Using (16), the share of intrafirm trade in 
O1DQ can be represented  by 
S.-  - =  +a(ji/2)  for E  E O1DQ,  (19)  I  j  s2pxM'  +  ap.L 
where s2pxM' +  ap. is the volume  of exports  from country  1. There- 
fore, for given relative country size a widening  of the difference  in the 
H to L ratio between  country  1 and country  2 increases  the share of 
intrafirm trade (because  it increases  [j  and  reduces  Ml). 
For an endowment  point  in O2QDG we have M2  =  [u, so that (15), 
(16), and  (13a) imply: 
S.  -  px mnM  (s 
I 
2M '  I)  for ,E  0 2QD  G,  (20)  (1  -  s')pxM  +  PXj1(s' -  OIA) 
S._/  =  a(Aji2) 
forE  E  O2QDG.  (21)  -  (1  -  s)pxM  +  pxVL(s'  -  ix) 
Assume s1 >  0Y  in this region.  Then,  for a given relative country size, 
starting  from  02Q  the  share  of  intra-industry  trade  rises  with  in- 
creases in the  difference  between  the  It  to L ratio in country  1 and 
country  2, and it may reach a maximum  and decline  afterward.  This 
pattern is similar to that in 0 IDQ. The  share of intrafirm trade, on the 
other  hand,  is larger  the  larger  the  difference  in relative  factor en- 
dowments  (given  relative  country  size). 
In  region  O2GF country  2  exports  only  differentiated  products. 
Therefore,  because  of' balanced  trade,  at endowment  points  that be- 
long to it s  I p > s2M  '. Using  this relationship  as well as (14), (15), and 
(16),  we  find  that on  lines  in O2GF that  represent  constant  relative 
country size, the share of intra-industry  trade declines with increasing 
differences  in relative  factor endowments  and the share of  intrafirm 
trade is constant. 
The  broad picture  that emerges  from this analysis is that for given 
relative country  size the  share  of' intrafirm  trade  is larger the  larger 
the difference  in relative factor endowments,  but that in the presence 
of multinational  corporations  no clear-cut relationship  exists between 
the  share  of  intra-industry  trade  and  differences  in  relative  factor 
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VII.  Concluding  Comments 
I have developed  in this paper  a general  equilibrium  theory of inter- 
national  trade  in which  multinational  corporations  play an essential 
role. This  theory can identify  and analyze the implications  of circum- 
stances  in  which  corporations  find  it profitable  to  become  multina- 
tional.  These  corporations  are  well-defined  economic  entities,  they 
possess  firm-specific  assets, they engage  in monopolistic  competition, 
and they play an active role in foreign  trade. The  theory explains  the 
simultaneous  existence  of  intersectoral  trade,  intra-industry  trade, 
and  intrafirm  trade.  Despite  the  relative  richness  of  the  theory  it 
needs  further  extensions  and  elaborations  in order  to deal  with the 
wide range of problems  that are at the heart of international  econom- 
ics.  An  extension  of  the  current  theory  to  horizontally  as  well  as 
vertically  integrated  corporations  is presented  in  Helpman  (1983b). 
This  extension  generates  more  realistic  patterns  of  resource  alloca- 
tion  without  altering  the  fundamental  properties  of  trade  patterns 
that were derived  in the current  study. In particular, integrated  mul- 
tinational  corporations  end  up having  production  facilities in parent 
as well as in host  countries,  and  the  existence  of  vertical integration 
brings  about  intrafirm  trade  both  in H  services  and  in intermediate 
inputs.  This  realism  is achieved  at a substantial  cost in terms  of  the 
complexity  of  the  theory  of  the  firm.  Nevertheless,  I  believe  the 
benefit-cost  ratio to be larger  than  one.  The  current  theory  can also 
explain  cross-country  penetration  of  multinational  corporations  as a 
result of impediments  to trade (such as transport costs or tariffs). This 
is evident  from  the  fact that the establishment  of a new plant for the 
same variety requires  additional  fixed  costs but saves the costs associ- 
ated with trade impediments  and does  not require  the hiring  of new 
H  factors.  Hence,  for  sufficiently  high  impediments,  cross-country 
penetration  is expected. 
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